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THE DEFINITION OF MACH’S PRINCIPLE 1
Julian Barbour 2
Abstract. Two definitions of Mach’s principle are proposed. Both are
related to gauge theory, are universal in scope and amount to formulations
of causality that take into account the relational nature of position, time,
and size. One of them leads directly to general relativity and may have
relevance to the problem of creating a quantum theory of gravity.
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1 Introduction
Ernst Mach’s suggestion that inertial motion is not governed by Newton’s
absolute space and time but by the totality of masses in the universe [1, 2, 3,
4] was the primary stimulus to Einstein’s creation of general relativity and
1It is a pleasure to celebrate with this paper the 80th birthday of my PhD supervisor
Peter Mittelstaedt, who has taken a life-long interest in Mach’s principle.
2College Farm, The Town, South Newington, Banbury, Oxon, OX15 4JG, UK; email:
Julian.Barbour@physics.ox.ac.uk.
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suggested its name. In 1918 Einstein [5], [6] (p. 185/6) coined the expres-
sion Mach’s principle for Mach’s idea and attempted a precise definition of
it in the context of general relativity. Somewhat ironically, Einstein later
disowned Mach’s principle [7], but it has continued to fascinate researchers.
So many definitions of Mach’s principle have been proposed that it has
often been dismissed as incapable of precise formulation. I shall argue that
this is because the issue at stake has not been addressed at a sufficiently basic
level. For this reason, I shall not discuss the numerous attempted definitions
but instead propose two candidate definitions, both of which arise from very
basic considerations related to observability and the definition of causality
(more precisely, determinism) in the classical dynamics of either particles or
fields. I believe that the correct definition of Mach’s principle is important
precisely because it relates to basic issues that are likely to play an important
role in the creation of quantum gravity.
The essential content of this paper could be expressed in a quarter of its
length, but I have opted for a discursive presentation. This is so that I can
put the definition of Mach’s principle in an adequate historical perspective
that distinguishes transient concepts of ‘what the world is made of’ from
the normative principles of empirical adequacy and causality, which, if not
eternal, have been a key part of the scientific outlook since it came into
being. The fact is that Mach formulated his principle in terms of Newtonian
masses and interaction at a distance, and Einstein eventually came to believe
that the principle was made obsolete by the rise of field theory and local
interaction. But Einstein thereby confused ontology-independent principles
with their application to transient ontology. A key aim of this paper is
to identify first principles that do not need to be abandoned when more
superficial concepts change.
To that end, I shall begin by emphasizing that Newton introduced ab-
solute space and time to define velocity, which is displacement in unit time,
as the first step in creating dynamics. Having understood this, we can ask
if there is an alternative to Newton’s absolute definition. At this point it
is important to establish what the alternative should achieve. Mach was
primarily concerned with empirical adequacy: displacement should be rela-
tive to something observable and time must be derived from actual change.
These are ontology-independent requirements. But they are in fact met
indirectly in Newtonian theory if properly interpreted, as Mach came to rec-
ognize and I shall show. Mach’s instinct still told him Newtonian theory
needed modification to close the gap between its basic notions and direct
empirical input, but he failed to do this or to provide a criterion that would
confirm success in the enterprise.
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This is where the formulation of causality enters the story. Drawing on a
penetrating but largely overlooked analysis by Poincare´ [8, 9], I shall suggest
that Mach should have required Newtonian dynamics to be replaced by a
theory that, in a well-defined sense, has maximal predictive power. In other
words, the theory should be as strongly causal, in a sense that I shall make
precise, as one can make it. The important thing about this principle is that
it turns out to be applicable not only to the Newtonian ontology of masses
and interactions at a distance, but to all conceivable ontologies of the world
provided only that they are subject to continuous symmetries. The rise of
the theory of Lie groups and its widespread application in the gauge theories
of modern physics has shown that such ontologies are ubiquitous. It is in
this sense that I aim to persuade the reader of the universality of Mach’s
principle as presented here. It is intimately related to the gauge principle.
In fact, as already indicated, I shall propose two possible definitions of
Mach’s principle. The first does have maximal predictive power, while in the
second that is weakened marginally. I leave the explanation for this to the
end of the paper, and merely comment here that the alternative definition
has mathematical virtues that could outweigh its slightly weaker predictive
strength. Moreover, the alternative definition is realized in general relativity
in an intriguing manner.
2 Newton’s Argument for Absolute Space
In 1644 Descartes published his Principles of Philosophy [10, 11], in which he
argued that motion is relative. He did this in order to advance an essentially
Copernican scheme without offending the Inquisition [12]. I will not detail
here his resulting inconsistencies but merely note that he begins by asserting
among other things that
• The position and motion of any considered body is defined only relative
to other bodies.
• Since there are infinitely many bodies in the universe that are all
moving in different ways and any of these can be taken as a reference body,
any considered body has infinitely many positions and motions.
He then proposed certain laws of motion, the most important of which
exactly anticipated Newton’s first law: a free body will either remain at rest
or move rectilinearly at a uniform speed. He did not attempt to reconcile
this with his ‘official’ relationalism.
At some unknown date before the mid 1680s, Newton wrote a Latin
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text De gravitatione, first published in 1962 [13]. Much more clearly than
the Scholium to the Principia (1687) [14], it spells out Newton’s reason for
introducing absolute space (see [12]).
Like Descartes, Newton accepted that bodies move relative to each other
in space. The bodies are visible, but space is not. Newton was clearly
inspired by Descartes’s idea of doing for motion what Euclid had done for
geometry: formulate axioms. More clearly than many modern authors, to
say nothing of his contemporaries, Newton saw that the first task in such an
undertaking is the definition of velocity. He noted especially a fatal flaw in
Descartes’s relationalism: it would be impossible to say that any given body
moves rectilinearly – the bodies used to define its motion could be moving
arbitrarily and, moreover, chosen arbitrarily.
He saw the need for the definition of what may be called equilocality : the
identification of points that can be said to have the same place at different
times. In a solid, each of its points can be assumed distinguishable and fixed.
Rectilinear motion relative to them is well defined. But in the Cartesian
universe the bodies, even if assumed distinguishable, merely have observable
mutual separations rij in otherwise invisible space. One can say how the rij
change but not how any body moves.
Newton understood this very clearly. It is possible that he considered
the possibility of defining the motion of any particular body relative to
the totality of bodies in the universe, but he must have dismissed that for
two reasons. First, according to the prevailing mechanical philosophy the
universe should be infinite and contain infinitely many bodies. One could
never include all the reference bodies needed to define displacement. Second,
in any one instant a given body would have a definite position relative to all
the other bodies in the universe. If they were all to remain fixed relative to
each other, the displacement of the considered body relative to them would
be uniquely defined. But, as Newton noted, velocity is defined as the ratio of
a displacement in a given time. During this time, the reference bodies would
be moving in all sorts of different ways, making the definition of a unique
displacement virtually impossible. Faced with these seemingly insuperable
difficulties, Newton concluded his discussion of motion in De gravitatione
by stating
it is necessary that the definition of places, and hence of ... motion, be
referred to some motionless thing such as extension alone or space in
so far as it is seen to be truly distinct from bodies.
Newton’s ‘motionless thing’ acquired the grand title absolute space in
the famous Scholium that immediately follows the definitions at the start of
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the Principia, to which we now turn.
3 The Scholium Problem and Inertial Systems
Newton acknowledged that only relative positions and times are observable.
He argued that his invisible absolute motions could be deduced from the
visible relative motions and concluded the Scholium in the Principia by
claiming that how this is to be done “shall be explained more at large in the
following treatise. For to this end it was that I composed it.” In fact, he
never returned to the issue in the body of the Principia – and it has been
remarkably neglected ever since. Let me formulate this problem, of which
Newton was acutely aware, in modern terms:
The Scholium Problem. Given only the successive separations rij of a
system of particles that form a closed dynamical system in Euclidean
space and told that there does exist an inertial frame of reference in
which the particles obey Newton’s laws and are interacting in accor-
dance with his law of universal gravitation, how can one confirm this
fact and find the motions in, for definiteness, the system’s centre-of-
mass inertial system? For simplicity and without loss of insight, it may
be assumed that the particle masses are given.
This problem, whose solution will be discussed below, could only be
neglected because nature provided material substitutes of absolute space
and time with respect to which Newton’s laws were found to hold with
remarkable accuracy: the fixed stars as a spatial frame of reference and the
rotation of the earth with respect to the stars as a measure of time [15]. It
was only in the second half of the 19th century that scientists began to take
a more critical attitude to the foundations of dynamics and consider how
the Scholium Problem could be solved.
In fact, it was Mach’s qualitative critique of Newton’s concepts – I shall
come to it shortly – that stimulated Lange [16] to attack the problem. He
supposed three particles ejected from some common point that then move
freely (force-free particles) and took their successive positions to define a
material spatiotemporal frame of reference that he called an inertial system.
By Galilean relativity, such a system can only be determined up to Galilean
transformations. However, with respect to any such system one can verify
whether other bodies, including ones with nontrivial interactions, do move
according to Newton’s laws.
Even though the notion of a force-free particle is not unproblematic,
Lange deserves great credit for this partial solution to the Scholium Prob-
5
lem, and his term inertial system, or inertial frame of reference, has become
standard. However, his actual method is rather cumbersome and mechani-
cal, and a conceptually much cleaner and more illuminating procedure had
already been proposed by Tait in 1883 [17]. I shall discuss this in a general-
ization that takes into account not only the relativity of position and time
but also scale. The important thing is to establish the amount of infor-
mation needed to determine an inertial system. Most textbooks nowadays
define one simply as a frame of reference in which Newton’s laws hold; they
seldom describe its actual determination or the observational input that it
needs. We shall see that this last is the key to the definition of Mach’s
principle in either of the two forms that I propose.
In the spirit of Tait’s note, suppose a system of N point particles that
are said to be moving inertially. We are handed ‘snapshots’ of them taken at
certain unspecified instants by a ‘God-observer’. Since only dimensionless
quantities have physical meaning, we take them to give us dimensionless
separations rˆij :
rˆij =
rij
r
, r =
√∑
i<j
r2ij, (1)
where rij are the separations measured with some arbitrary scale.
In a Cartesian representation, the particles have 3N coordinates, but the
rˆij contain only 3N − 7 objective (observable) data: three are lost because
the position of the centre of mass is unknown, three because the orientation
is unknown, and one because the scale is unknown. Equivalently we can
say that the positions are known only up to Euclidean translations (3),
rotations (3) and dilatations (1). We have gauge redundancy corresponding
to the similarity group of Euclidean space.
Tait’s problem is: how can one use the snapshots to confirm that the
particles are moving inertially, and how many snapshots are needed? The
solution to the problem is simple but instructive.
By Galilean relativity, we can certainly take particle 1 to be perpetually
at rest at the origin of the frame that is to be found. Next, at some instant,
particle 2 will, in that frame, pass through its least separation from particle
1, which can be taken to be the distance 1 (this fixes the unit of distance).
Further, we can choose the coordinate axes and the unit of time such that
particle 2 moves with unit velocity in the xy plane along the line x = 1, y = t.
The coordinates of these two particles are therefore fixed to be (0, 0, 0) and
(1, t, 0); we have eliminated irrelevant ambiguity. However, at the instant
t = 0 all the other particles can have arbitrary positions and velocities, so
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that a generic inertial solution needs 6× (N − 2) = 6N − 12 data to be fully
specified.
We have noted that each snapshot contains 3N−7 independent objective
data, i.e., dimensionless separations. However, the times at which they are
taken are unknown, so in fact we have only 3N − 8 real data. Thus, two
snapshots contain 6N − 16 usable data, which is 4 short of the number
6N − 12 needed to construct the frame. However, provided N is large
enough, three snapshots contain enough information to construct the data
and provide independent checks that the particles are all moving inertially
in a common spatiotemporal frame. 3 Note that the determination of time
is inseparably tied to the determination of the spatial frame and that both
can only be found because a definite law of motion is operative.
Tait’s result is characteristic, and it shows that for the simplest (inertial)
Newtonian problem ‘two-snapshot’ relational initial data do not suffice to
predict the evolution. There is a four-parameter shortfall in the relational
data. In the realistic case in which interactions are present (gravity is never
absent), there is a five-parameter shortfall. From the Newtonian perspective,
the information that is lacking is: the value of the angular momentum L, the
amount of kinetic energy in overall expansion or contraction of the system
(because there is no absolute scale), and the value of the dimensionless
instantaneous ratio T/V , where T is the total kinetic energy of the system
and V is its potential energy.
It is a reflection on the way in which dynamics is taught that, in my
experience, even distinguished scientists struggle to get to grips with Tait’s
problem and identify the reasons for the shortfall. That it is an issue is
even new to them. Note also that 4/5 of the shortfall already arises for pure
inertial motion; only 1/5 arises from interactions and accelerations. This
shows that, contrary to what is frequently said, the problem of absolute vs
relative motion is not the difference between inertial and accelerated motion.
Moreover, Newton introduced absolute space to define inertial motion, as is
clear from his discussion in De gravitatione (see my discussion in [12]).
To conclude this section, it needs to be emphasized that there is no
epistemological defect in Newtonian mechanics; it is possible to construct
inertial systems from observed relative motions [18], p. 44. If there is a
defect, it resides in the curious shortfall just established, as we shall see
when we come to Poincare´’s critique.
3Fully relational dynamics – with no absolute space (i.e., no a priori equilocality rela-
tion), time or scale – has no content unless N ≥ 3; for N = 3 and N = 4 more than three
snapshots are needed to solve Tait’s problem.
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4 Mach’s Intuitive Critique
Mach’s contribution [1, 2, 3, 4] to the debate about the nature of motion
was threefold but mostly took the form of suggestive comments rather than
precise prescriptions. Mach’s fundamental objection was to Newton’s re-
liance on structure not directly derived from observation: in my terminol-
ogy, equilocality at different times and the metric of time. Although aware
of Riemann’s revolutionary ideas about geometry, he did not object to the
use of Euclidean space at a given time; he frequently talks about the ob-
servable separations between bodies in a manner which clearly implies that
these separations are compatible with Euclidean geometry.
In fact, Mach’s contribution was threefold:
• The dynamics of the universe should be described directly and solely
in terms of the changes in the observable separations. Speaking about the
Copernican revolution, he said [4], p. 284: “The universe is not twice given,
with an earth in rest and an earth in motion; but only once, with its relative
motions, alone determinable.”
• The measure of time must be derived from change: “It is utterly beyond
our power to measure the changes of things by time. Quite the contrary,
time is an abstraction at which we arrive by means of the changes of things”
[4], p. 273.
• The specific behaviour identified by Newton as inertial motion could
arise from some causal action of all the masses of the universe; this could
lead to some observable effects different from Newtonian theory: “Newton’s
experiment with the rotating vessel of water simply informs us that the
relative rotation of the bucket with respect to the sides of the vessel produces
no noticeable centrifugal forces ... No one is competent to say how the
experiment would turn out if the sides of the vessel increased in thickness
and mass till they were ultimately several leagues thick” [4], p. 284.
The first two of these had been anticipated in Newton’s time by Leibniz
[19] and others. The third was revolutionary. Combined with the first two,
it suggests a new concept of motion. The Newtonian view is captured in the
subtitle “How solitary bodies are moved” of another unpublished paper ‘The
laws of motion’ [20], p. 208, that seems to be earlier thanDe gravitatione. By
seeking laws governing individual (solitary) bodies, Newton had no option
but to assume that they move in space as time passes. As we shall see,
implementation of Mach’s principle requires us to consider, not the motion
of bodies in space and time, but positions of the universe in its configuration
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space. This claim needs some amplification.
The development of variational mechanics (described beautifully by Lanc-
zos [21]) led to the notion of the configuration space Q of a closed dynamical
system. In this formalism, the points in Q that represent the realized instan-
taneous configurations of the system lie on a curve in Q called the dynamical
orbit of the system. It should be noted that when Newtonian mechanics is
represented in this manner, the definition of Q is based on positions in an
inertial frame of reference. As we have seen, this is problematic since such
frames are obtained through a nontrivial process. The first step in the
definition of Mach’s principle will be the identification of an appropriate
configuration space in which it is to be implemented.
It will also be necessary to think about time. In the standard accounts of
dynamics, the point in Q that represents the instantaneous configuration of
the system moves along the orbit as the time t passes. But what is this t? If
textbooks address this question at all, it is generally said that t is provided
by a clock external to the system. But if we have no access to anything
outside the considered system, as for example a solar system surrounded
by opaque dust clouds or, more relevantly, the universe, a measure of time
must somehow be extracted from within the system itself. However, all the
changes to which Mach referred are encoded in the curve in Q. We seem
to be confronted with a vicious circle – we cannot determine the evolution
parameter, which must now be extracted from differences along the curve,
before the curve itself has been determined. Two different ways to resolve
this problem will be presented later, both involving information encoded
in a curve in Q. For the moment, I simply want to point out that Mach
criticized Newton’s concept of absolute time as forcefully as the concept of
absolute space. Few people have noted this, though Mittelstaedt coined the
expression second Mach’s principle [22, 23] in order to draw attention to the
issue.
Finally, a problem with Mach’s writings – and the cause of much confu-
sion and dispute – is that he did not provide a criterion that would establish
when a theory is Machian. In fact, it is possible to rewrite the content of
Newton’s laws directly in terms of the observable separations – I shall discuss
this directly – and thus seemingly meet Mach’s requirement without chang-
ing the physical content of Newtonian theory. This is in fact what Lange,
stimulated by Mach’s critique, showed: Newtonian dynamics can be put on
a sound epistemological basis, i.e., related to directly observable quantities.
(This, of course, presupposes that Newtonian theory is physically correct. I
shall discuss relativity later.)
Much more could be said about Mach and the way in which he has been
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misunderstood, but it will be more helpful to move on directly to Poincare´.
5 Poincare´’s Strengthened Relativity Principle
In his Science and Hypothesis [8, 9], Poincare´ has some pertinent things to
say about the problems of absolute and relative motion, which he comments
have been much discussed in recent times. He says that it is repugnant to
the philosopher to imagine that the universe can rotate in an invisible space
but then poses the decisive question: what precise defect, if any, arises within
Newtonian dynamics from its use of absolute space? It is the answer to this
question that will provide us with both the definitions of Mach’s principle
to be proposed in this paper.
For the purposes of his discussion, Poincare´ assumes that a definition of
time is given and that the distances between bodies in (Euclidean) space can
be directly measured. Thus, he presupposes the existence of a standard clock
and rod. In an extension of his way of thinking, I shall, when formulating
Mach’s principle, dispense with these as in my discussion of Tait’s problem.
However, I shall stick with Poincare´’s assumptions for the moment. What
he in effect said was this. Let us suppose particles of known masses mi, i =
1, 2, ..., N, in space between which observers can, at any instant, observe the
inter-particle separations rij and, a clock being granted, the rates of change
r˙ij of the rij. Thus, at any instant the observers have access to rij , r˙ij .
Poincare´ also assumes that they know that the bodies satisfy Newton’s laws
of motion and are governed by the law of universal gravitation. He then
asks: given such initial data, is it possible to predict uniquely the evolution
of the rij , i.e., the observable evolution?
The answer is no, and the reason is evident from the discussion of Tait’s
problem: the data rij , r˙ij contain no information about the angular mo-
mentum L in the system. That this is so is readily seen after a moment’s
reflection on the two-body Kepler problem. At perihelion or aphelion any
planet is moving at right angles to the line joining it to the sun, so that the
planet–sun separation r is not changing: r˙ = 0. But the initial data r, r˙ = 0
can lead to all possible Keplerian motions, including both circular motion
and direct fall into the sun. It is the angular momentum, invisible in the
data r, r˙ = 0, that makes the difference. Since three pieces of information
are encoded in the vector L, two in its direction and one in its magnitude,
we arrive at this important conclusion: in the generic – and archetypal –
problem of N bodies interacting with any central forces, specification of ini-
tial data in the form rij, r˙ij will leave a three-parameter unpredictability
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in the evolution. When the invisibility of scale and time are taken into ac-
count, this becomes a five-parameter unpredictability, as is clear from the
discussion of Tait’s problem.
This unpredictability arises exclusively from the difference between spec-
ifying purely relative quantities and specification in an inertial frame of ref-
erence, for which perfect Laplacian determinism and causality holds. The
shortfall in predictive power is the price that has to be paid for Newton’s
introduction of absolute kinematic structure that is independent of the con-
tents and relative motions of the objects in the universe. Thus, the case
for modifying Newtonian theory is not to improve its epistemological status
but its predictive power. It is an argument from causality, not epistemology.
Before making this idea explicit, I want to point out that Poincare´ devised
a way to characterize the nature of theories that is different from the one
that has become universal through the manner in which Einstein created
his theories of relativity.
Einstein’s approach focussed all attention on the symmetries of the laws
of nature: under what transformation laws do they retain the same form?
In his attempt to implement Mach’s ideas, Einstein sought to make the
transformation laws as general as possible. He was initially [24] convinced
that general covariance was a powerful physical principle but later [5] ac-
cepted Kretschmann’s argument [25] that it had only formal mathematical
significance. Since then there has been much inconclusive debate about the
meaning of relativity principles and general covariance. I do not wish to get
into it here because I believe that in his Science and Hypothesis Poincare´
proposed a more fruitful and unambiguous approach. This was to define
relativity in terms of the amount of information needed to be specified in
coordinate-independent (gauge-invariant) form if the evolution is to be pre-
dicted uniquely. I shall strengthen Poincare´’s formulation in order to be
able later to define Mach’s principle in the strongest and cleanest form.
Suppose we live in a Newtonian universe and consider a dynamically
isolated N -body subsystem within it. There are two ways in which we can
study the subsystem. The first is in the standard Newtonian manner in
an inertial frame of reference, while the second concentrates exclusively on
what is actually observable within the subsystem.
Now, as Poincare´ noted, certain details of the subsystem’s initial state
when specified relative to its inertial system have no effect on its subsequent
directly observable evolution. Thus, one can imagine the initial configuration
of the system rotated and translated without this having any effect. By
Galilean relativity, a uniform velocity imparted to the subsystem also has
no effect. Let us do some counting. Three numbers specify the position
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of the origin of the inertial frame relative to the subsystem, three more
specify the orientation of its axes, and three more the translational velocity
of the origin. All of these have no observable effect within the subsystem.
But whereas one can boost the origin of the inertial frame, in a passive
transformation, or equivalently the centre of mass of the subsystem, in an
active transformation, one cannot ‘boost the orientation’. This is because
of the dynamical effect of angular momentum, which is not encoded in the
rij , r˙ij but shows up in the second and higher derivatives r¨ij, ... as the
system evolves.
This is the nub. Poincare´ argued that this breakdown of relational pre-
dictability is the only ‘defect’ in Newtonian dynamics that arises from its
use of absolute space. He said that, “for the mind to be fully satisfied”, a
strengthened form of the relativity principle must hold: the relational data
rij , r˙ij should determine the evolution uniquely. However, he noted with
regret that the solar system is an effectively isolated system and manifestly
does not satisfy such a strengthened relativity principle; nature does not
work the way philosophers would like.
This is the place to mention the famous study of the Newtonian three-
body problem made by Lagrange in 1772 [26]; it was surely at the back
of Poincare´’s mind when formulating his critique of Newtonian dynamics.
In his study, Lagrange assumed Newtonian gravitational dynamics to be
correct but then reformulated its equations in terms of the separations rij
between the three particles. He obtained three equations that contain third
derivatives with respect to the time and thus for their solution need spec-
ification of rij, r˙ij , r¨ij as initial data. This showed that Newtonian theory
with nontrivial interactions (and not only in the case of inertial motion as
in Tait’s problem) could be perfectly well expressed in terms of directly ob-
servable quantities. 4 It has no epistemological defect, as has already been
noted. What remains very curious is that when N is large only very few of
the second derivatives r¨ij need to be specified in addition to rij, r˙ij . It is
also manifestly clear that a theory in which only rij, r˙ij need to be specified
will have greater predictive power.
In Science and Hypothesis, Poincare´ does not mention Mach’s ideas
about the origin of inertia. As they were well known, this surprises me.
If Poincare´ was unaware of them, this may explain why he admitted regret-
fully that nature seemed to have no respect for his strengthened relativity
principle and that we would simply have to accept what nature tells us. But
4Lagrange’s work was extended to arbitrary N by Betti [27] and, using powerful modern
techniques, by Albouy and Chenciner [28].
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Mach made it clear that we could only hope to gain a satisfactory under-
standing of dynamics by including the whole universe in our considerations.
This opens up the possibility that the universe evolves in accordance with a
stronger relativity principle than subsystems within it. Its overall behaviour
need not be so philosophically repugnant as Poincare´ believed.
To conclude this part of the discussion, Poincare´’s analysis has two
virtues: 1) it employs coordinate-free language and is expressed solely in
terms of gauge-invariant (observable) quantities; 2) it provides the precise
criterion that Mach failed to formulate.
6 Configurations and Gauge Redundancy
As preparation for the definition of Mach’s principle and to demonstrate that
it has universal applicability, I want to draw attention to a widespread phe-
nomenon in nature, introducing it by asking this question: what empirical
content underlies Euclidean geometry?
Rods that remain mutually congruent to a good accuracy are crucial.
Using them, we can measure angles and ratios of lengths. These dimension-
less quantities have objective physical meaning. In fact, I suspect that all
quantitative measures in science reduce ultimately to measurement of angles
and length ratios. (Of course, one can count apples, but I am referring to
measurement of their size.) It is certainly true that ancient astronomy right
up to Kepler’s discoveries relied entirely on angle measurements, including
those used to obtain time from the observed revolution of the stars.
We can think of Euclidean geometry in the following terms. By means
of a rod, we can measure the distances between N,N ≥ 5, particles at
some instant. We obtain N(N − 1)/2 positive numbers, the inter-particle
distances. They could have been arbitrary, but empirically (for N ≥ 5 in
three dimensions) they satisfy algebraic equations (and inequalities). These
empirical relations may be called the Euclidean rules.
They permit remarkable data compression in the representation of facts.
In a globular cluster containing a million stars there are at any instant ≈ 1012
distances between them. All this in principle independent information can
be encoded by 3 · 106 Cartesian coordinates. This is a colossal reduction,
but it comes with inescapable redundancy and frame arbitrariness. One
can pass freely between Cartesian frames by Euclidean translations and
rotations; there is a 3 + 3 = 6-fold degeneracy. In fact, since the choice of
the rod (which defines the unit of length) is arbitrary, dilatations must be
taken into account, and there is a 3 + 3 + 1-fold degeneracy. Thus, for N
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particles, there are 3N Cartesian coordinates but only 3N − 7 true (frame-
independent) degrees of freedom. This ‘economic representation with group
redundancy’ will be decisive when we come to consider dynamics.
In fact, the very possibility of having dynamics is intimately related to
another facet of geometry, its ‘procreative’ capacity. One single set of dis-
tances between N points, defining a relative configuration, is sufficient to
establish the possibility of placing them in a Cartesian frame with coordi-
nates xi. The original empirically determined distances are then given by
rij = |xi − xj|. Then infinitely many other relative configurations can be
generated by simply specifying freely any N Cartesian vectors, which form a
Cartesian configuration, and calculating the distances between them by the
rule just given. A whole space of relative configurations can be generated
in this way. It is, however, an inescapable fact that many distinct Cartesian
configurations give rise to one and the same relative configuration. This is
so whenever two Cartesian configurations are congruent, so that one can
be carried into exact coincidence with the other by Euclidean translations
and rotations (and scaling if we include that). A group of motions acts on
the configurations, leaving invariant the the interparticle separations, which
we measure more or less directly and regard as physical. In contrast, the
Cartesian coordinates are gauge dependent, being changed by the action of
the group of motions.
In the light of the above remarks, it is helpful to distinguish three spaces.
The first is the familiar Newtonian configuration space Q, which for N
particles has 3N Cartesian coordinates. If we identify all configurations in
Q that can be carried into exact congruence by the transformations of the
Euclidean group, we obtain the relative configuration space R. This is not
a subspace of Q but a distinct quotient space. If, in addition, we identify all
configurations that have the same shape (adding dilatations to the group of
motions), the identified configurations form shape space S, which again is a
distinct space, not a subspace of Q.
If we are considering a single configuration, the economic bonus of using
Cartesian coordinates vastly outweighs any inconvenience in the arbitrari-
ness. However, if distances between N objects are established when they
are in two different relative configurations there is in principle no connection
between the Cartesian frames chosen to represent each configuration. This
gives rise to serious frame arbitrariness and the first fundamental problem
of motion [12]. The second such problem relates to time: two such configu-
rations contain no information about the lapse of time between them.
The ‘economic representation with group redundancy’ discussed above
is a characteristic feature of nature that has stimulated much mathematics,
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above all the theory of Lie groups and algebras. Further examples with
different groups of motion are:
• It can be established by measurement that the magnetic fieldB(xi), i =
1, 2, 3, is always such that div B = 0. One can therefore represent this
empirical fact in a mathematically convenient form by introducing a vector
potential A(xi) such that
curl A = B, (2)
but A carries redundant gauge information, and
curl
(
A+
∂ φ
∂ x
)
≡ curl A = B,
so that the gauge transformation
A→ A+
∂ φ
∂ x
, (3)
where φ(xi) is an arbitrary scalar function, leaves the represented empiri-
cal data unchanged. The space of 3-vector fields A with gauge redundancy
can be quotiented by the symmetry to obtain the space of gauge-invariant
magnetic fields B. In contrast to the spatial gauge redundancy of the first
example, this is the simplest [SU(1), Abelian] example of an internal sym-
metry. The non-Abelian gauge symmetries of Yang–Mills fields are further
examples. The group of motions that here acts on the configurations is
infinite dimensional and hence a generalization of a Lie group of motions.
• Infinitely many distance measurements between all pairs of points in
a three-dimensional manifold M can in principle reveal empirically that it
carries a Riemannian 3-geometry. 5 This can be represented by means of a
3-metric gij . However, the six components of the symmetric gij include not
only information about the geometry but also about the coordinates used
to represent it. Any two metrics related by a coordinate transformation will
represent the same 3-geometry, and the six components of gij will represent
three geometrical degrees of freedom and three coordinate, or gauge, degrees
of freedom. Again we have a remarkably convenient and economic represen-
tation but with redundancy. The group of motions in this case is the group
of three-dimensional diffeomorphisms.
The configuration space with redundancy is called Riem; it is the space of
all (suitably continuous) Riemannian 3-metrics defined onM. The space of
5The manifoldM is assumed to be compact without boundary to provide the basis for
a dynamically closed universe.
15
gauge-invariant 3-geometries is obtained by quotienting by 3-diffeomorphisms
and is called superspace:
Superspace :=
Riem
3-diffeomorphisms
.
• One could also argue that all distance measurements are local and only
establish ratios. Then one would conclude that any two 3-metrics
gij(x), ϕ(x)
4gij(x)
related by a conformal transformation
gij(x)→ ϕ(x)
4gij(x), (4)
generated by the positive scalar function ϕ represent the same physical
configuration. 6 This further quotienting by three-dimensional conformal
transformations leads to the infinite-dimensional space known as conformal
superspace. It has precisely two (local) degrees of freedom per space point.
These examples show that the original property of nature that gave rise
to Mach’s critique of Newtonian mechanics is ubiquitous. It is economic
representation of instantaneous configurations with redundancy and sug-
gests that the correctly formulated Mach’s principle should be universal in
scope and apply in all cases in which such redundancy occurs. In fact, I
shall argue that whenever this characteristic redundancy is recognized in in-
dividual configurations, it predetermines a unique dynamical theory of such
configurations that is of gauge type. 7 In this connection, O´ Raifeartaigh
notes [29], p. 13, that “the curl property of the magnetic field was known
quite early and led, for example, to Stokes’ theorem”. In fact, coupled with
the definition of Mach’s principle given later, it could have led directly with
no further input to Maxwell’s equations in vacuum [30].
It is worth noting here that physical conceptions have changed greatly
since Mach’s time. It is therefore necessary to reconsider his critique in
the light of developments and above all identify the central issue. If we
6The purely conventional fourth power of ϕ is chosen to simplify the transformation
behaviour of the (three-dimensional) scalar curvature R under (4). In four dimensions,
the second power is chosen for the same reason.
7It is unfortunate that the word ‘gauge’ is used in several different senses and often
loosely, which leads to much confusion. In my view the decisive thing is the fact that
one starts with instantaneous spatial configurations on which a group of motions acts. It
generates gauge transformations of the configurations. A dynamical theory of gauge type
arises from this fact.
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accept, as is implicit in Mach’s writings, that dynamics is to be built up on
the notion of configurations of the universe, the central problem is always
essentially the one that Newton recognized so clearly: how do you define
velocity in a relational context? Once Faraday and Maxwell had introduced
the notion of fields, this problem simply became that of defining rates of
change of fields. In all cases, the problem is the same and arises from the
fact that physically (as opposed to gauge related) different configurations do
not come with equilocality markings or preassigned time differences between
them.
In the light of this comment, it is interesting to consider a comment that
Einstein made in 1949 [7], p. 29:
Mach conjectures that in a truly rational theory inertia would have to
depend upon the interaction of the masses, precisely as was true for
Newton’s other forces, a conception which for a long time I considered
as in principle the correct one. It presupposes implicitly, however, that
the basic theory should be of the general type of Newton’s mechanics:
masses and their interactions as the original concepts. The attempt
at such a solution does not fit into a consistent field theory, as will be
immediately recognized.
Einstein here appears insensitive to the deep problem that Newton iden-
tified and Mach equally clearly recognized. The problem of defining change
exists in essentially the same form whatever the ontology of the universe.
The obsolescence of Mach’s ontology did not change the underlying problem.
Mach’s principle needs to be defined accordingly.
For this, we must also consider time. The above examples are all of
instantaneous spatial configurations on which a group of motions acts. The
great work of Lie, Klein and others in the last decades of the 19th century
led to the clear recognition that the mathematical representation of one
and the same spatial structure can be changed by the action of a group of
motions. The physical object is unchanged by this action. Minkowski and
Einstein extended this principle dramatically when they fused time with
space and, in spacetime, made it a further dimension barely distinguishable
from a spatial one. In this new picture, it was entirely natural on Einstein’s
part to seek to characterize the structure of spacetime by laws that did not
depend on arbitrary coordinate representation.
However, the concept of spacetime marked a radical departure from the
‘royal highroad of dynamics’ 8 laid out by Newton, Euler, Lagrange, Hamil-
ton and Jacobi. This had led to the key concepts of the configuration and
8Wheeler’s coining I believe.
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phase spaces, in which dynamical histories are parametrized by time. All of
this work had been done in the framework of the absolute space and time
inherited, admittedly often with unease, from Newton. A few dynamicists
were just beginning to consider the Machian issues when, in creating special
relativity, Einstein and Minkowski took physics down a new road. The ways
parted. The spacetime route led to general relativity, while Hamilton and
Jacobi’s synthesis of classical dynamics led to quantum mechanics in both
of its incarnations: matrix and wave mechanics. Quantum mechanics and
relativity have since coexisted uncomfortably, as one sees in the immense
difficulty in the creation of a quantum theory of gravity.
I believe that one source of this difficulty could be Minkowski’s virtual
elimination of the difference between time and space. In his picture one
cannot begin to formulate a Machian theory in which time is derived from
change. The time dimension is there from the beginning and exists indepen-
dently of the world’s happenings. Of course, Einstein modified this picture
very significantly in general relativity but not in a way in which one can
readily see whether time is derived from change.
Therefore, in order to gain a clear notion of time, there is a good case for
formulating Mach’s principle in terms of a configuration space Q, in which,
as I noted earlier, a measure of time can be extracted from the realized curve
in Q. However, Q cannot be the standard one based on absolute space. We
need one that is defined relationally by quotienting with respect to the group
of motions corresponding to the assumed ontology. As final preparation for
the definition of Mach’s principle, the following analysis of velocities defined
by frames of reference will highlight the difficulties that arise whenever the
configurations of physical systems have a gauge redundancy associated with
a group of motions.
7 The Decomposition of Velocities
To this end, it will be sufficient to consider the velocity decomposition that
can be made in the N -body problem, for which I draw on Saari’s discussion
[31]. Let the bodies have masses ma, a = 1, 2, ..., N, position vectors xai , i =
1, 2, 3, in an inertial frame of reference with origin permanently at the system
centre of mass, and velocities vai at some instant. Then x
a
i and v
a
i can be
‘packaged’ as 3×N -dimensional vectors X, V, where Xai = x
a
i and similarly
for vai . For such vectors the symmetries of Euclidean space define a natural
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inner product in configuration space:
< a ,b >=
∑
j
mj aj · bj , j = 1, 2, ..., 3N. (5)
The moment of inertia I and kinetic energy T of the system are then
2I =< R,R > , 2T =< V,V > .
With respect to the inner product (5) there exists a unique decomposition of
V relative to X into three orthogonal components: Vr, Vd,Vs, the parts of
V that correspond to a rotation of the system as a rigid body (Vr), to a di-
latation (Vd) of the system, and to a change of its intrinsic shape (Vs). As I
will shortly present an intuitive representation of the velocity decomposition
that will simultaneously suggest how Mach’s principle is to be implemented,
I refer the reader to [31] for the formal proof, which uses explicit group
transformations to determine Vd and Vr. The intrinsic change of shape Vs
is what remains:
Vs = V−Vd −Vr. (6)
It is important that the decomposition (6) relies on orthogonality with
respect to (5), which can only be established when all components of the
considered vectors are known and included. The decomposition is holistic
and respects Mach’s dictum that “nature does not begin with elements”
and that ultimately we must take everything into account (“the All”) [4],
pp. 287/8.
The velocity decomposition is important in the N -body problem because
the three velocity components interact as the system evolves. In the context
of Mach’s principle the decomposition is valuable because it provides a way
to combine the advantages of representation in a definite frame of reference
while identifying changes that are independent of the frame. Thus, given
any X in an arbitrary frame and any V in the same frame, one can establish
uniquely the part Vs of the latter that represents the intrinsic change of X.
Expressed in terms of the position and momentum vectors of the individual
particles, xa and pa, the parts pas of the momenta that express pure change
of shape must satisfy
∑
a
xa × pas = 0 . (7)
∑
a
xa · pas = 0 , (8)
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That (8) and (7) must hold is readily seen. For example, under an
infinitesimal dilatation xa → (1 + )xa, so that the corresponding momenta
will be proportional to xa. Then all the scalar products in (8) will all be
nonvanishing and have the same sign, so that (8) cannot vanish. Similarly,
under a rigid-body rotation, (7) cannot vanish.
The whole mystery of absolute and relative motion is reflected in this
velocity decomposition. Suppose we have N particles of known masses and
can determine the dimensionless separations (1) between them at any in-
stant. From the separations at any one instant 1, we can, having chosen
some scale, construct a Cartesian representation of the system. This gives
us the position vector X1 at that instant. It is natural to place the origin
of the frame at the centre of mass. For one single configuration, we feel no
unease about choosing the orientation of the axes relative to the configura-
tion in any arbitrary way. 9 However, three real difficulties arise if we now
consider a second relative configuration 2 that differs slightly from the first
and wish to regard it as having arisen from the first through motion. 10 How
is the second configuration to be placed relative to the first? What scale is
to be chosen for it? How much time do we believe has elapsed between the
two configurations? There is nothing intrinsic in the two configurations that
provides an answer to these questions. Different answers lead to different
velocity vectors and, in the N -body problem, very different evolutions.
Let us look at this difficulty a little closer and agree to adopt the X1
frame and an external measure of time. We can then let the particles move
with arbitrary velocities in that frame. But if we were to take the dimen-
sionless relative configuration when it is slightly different from X1 and give
it to different mathematicians, they would be incapable of reconstructing
velocity vectors V guaranteed to be the same. As we allow knowledge of the
masses, all they could be sure of agreeing on is the position of the centre of
mass. The orientation and scale of the second configuration relative to the
first and the separation in time between them are not fixed.
However, there is something on which they could agree, which is the
amount, assumed infinitesimal, by which the shape of the second config-
uration has changed compared with the first. They could do this simply
by noting the changes to the dimensionless separations (1), but this would
not suggest anything that one could call a natural quantitative measure of
the change. Fortunately, the velocity decomposition theorem does suggest
9We could consider choosing the axes along the principal axes of inertia but, except in
the case of rigid bodies, such a choice has no dynamical significance and, moreover, leads
to problems if the configuration happens to be symmetric.
10One could equally well suppose that the first had arisen from the second.
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a family of natural measures.
Represent once and for all the first configuration by a vector X1 in some
Cartesian frame of reference. Represent the second configuration in the same
frame with its centre of mass in any arbitrary position, with any orientation
and with any scale. This will give the vector X2. Choose an arbitrary ‘time
difference’ δt and call V = (X2−X1)/δt the velocity of the system. Then for
all possible positions of the centre of mass, orientation and scale of the second
configuration, calculate the scalar product < V,V > (note that this brings
in a weighting with the masses) and find the necessarily unique position,
orientation and scale for which this positive-definite quantity is minimized.
It is readily seen that this ‘best-matching’ procedure, which reduces the
‘incongruence’ of the two figures to a minimum, brings the centres of mass to
coincidence and ensures that for the extremalized quantities pa = maδxa/δt
the relations (8) and (7) hold with xa the position vectors of the particles
in the first configuration.
Note that the choice made for δt merely changes the magnitude of the
intrinsic velocity Vs that results from the extremalization, not the fact that
for it the relations (8) and (7) hold. Similarly, the position in which (8)
and (7) hold would still be the same if we were to multiply < V,V > by
any function of the configuration such as its Newtonian potential energy.
Because of this freedom, we do not obtain a unique measure of change but
all such measures are natural in that they derive from the metric (5), which
in turn derives from the fundamental Euclidean metric suitably modified
to take into account the presence of masses. The most important thing is
that the intrinsic velocity Vs that is obtained is orthogonal to the velocity
components generated by the gauge (symmetry) transformations whatever
‘best-matching’ measure is chosen. Different choices of the measure will be
significant in dynamics, but at any instant they merely change the magnitude
of the intrinsic velocities, not their directions.
We can summarize this state of affairs by saying that the extremal Vs
is a tangent vector on shape space. It has a magnitude and a direction. In
a space of a high number of dimensions, the direction contains much more
information than the magnitude, which is always represented by just one
number.
8 The Definition of Mach’s Principle
It is implicit, and often explicit, in Mach’s writings that motion of any
individual body is to be defined with respect to the entire universe ([4],
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pp. 286/7). This makes it possible to avoid the difficulty of Cartesian
relationalism, according to which a body has as many different motions
as potential reference bodies; a multiplicity of motions is replaced by a
single averaged motion. However, the Machian view point is only possible
if the unverse is a closed dynamical system. I shall say something about the
possibility of a truly infinite universe at the end of this paper.
If we do suppose that the universe is a closed system, we can attempt
to describe it by means of a relational configuration space obtained by some
quotienting with respect to a group of motions. One of the open issues in the
implementation of Mach’s principle is the extent to which this quotienting
should be taken. In all the examples listed earlier, angles (length ratios) are
taken to be fundamental. I have three arguments, none decisive it must be
admitted, for not considering quotienting that attempts to reduce physics to
something more basic than them. The first is instinctive: angle observations
do seem to be primal. The second is that if we take angles to be fundamen-
tal, the resulting theories will be built up on a dimensionless basis.11 This is
clearly an attractive, indeed necessary principle. My third reason for taking
angles to be fundamental is empirical: the existence of fermions, which are
described mathematically by spinors with finitely many components. This is
only possible if they are defined relative to an equivalence class of orthonor-
mal frames, which presuppose an inner product. The scale (orthonormal) is
for convenience in any particular case; it is the orthogonality and associated
invariance of angles defined by the inner product that is essential.12 Thus,
I believe that there is a case for taking angles to belong to the irreducible
geometrical bedrock of physics, but we shall see that, as of now, angles alone
do not seem to be sufficient.
We are now in a position to define Mach’s principle in both the stronger
and weaker forms that I propose. Its definition consists of two parts: a) the
identification of cases in which it is to be invoked and b) the stipulation of
what it is to achieve.
The Definition of Mach’s Principle: a) The application of Mach’s
11Time will not occur in the foundations of the Machian theory, and in particle me-
chanics the masses can be made dimensionless by dividing the action by the total mass
of the universe without changing the observable behaviour. Angles and length ratios are
obviously dimensionless.
12It is possible that the currently observed fermions described by finitely many com-
ponents are merely low energy excitations of spinorial entities with infinitely many com-
ponents. These do not need an orthogonal frame for their definition. I am indebted to
Friedrich Hehl for this observation.
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principle is to be considered whenever direct observations or theoretical
considerations suggest that the physical configuration space of a closed
dynamical system is to be obtained by group quotienting of a larger
configuration space that contains redundant information unobtainable by
direct observation; b) once the quotiented configuration space Q has been
selected, the dynamical theory defined on it is to be such that either 1)
specification of an initial point q ∈ Q together with a direction d in Q at q
defines a unique curve in Q as the evolution of the system given the
directly observable initial data q, d or 2) instead of a point q and direction,
a point and tangent vector at q are specified.
The decisive difference between both definitions and the corresponding
Newtonian law is reduction in the amount of information needed to specify
unique evolution. If one projects Newtonian histories down to shape space,
the preferred Q in this case, a five-parameter family of Newtonian solutions
can all pass through any given point q of Q in a given direction d at that
point. They are initially tangent to each other, but then ‘splay out’ in a
five-parameter family. In contrast, in the case of 1) there is a unique curve
that passes through q in the direction d. In case 2), a one-parameter family
of curves passes through q, all being tangent to each other at q. Although
case 2) leads to a less predictive theory than case 1), which until recently I
regarded as the formulation of Mach’s principle, it still corresponds to more
predictive power than Newtonian mechanics and has certain virtues:
• Vectors are amenable to mathematical manipulation in a way that
directions are not.
• If momentum vectors as opposed to normalized momenta (directions)
are allowed fundamental status, the momentum space of the system has the
same number of dimensions as the configuration space. This is important in
the transformation theory of quantum mechanics and might be significant
in quantum gravity.
• As my collaborator O´ Murchadha and I have recently shown [32],
general relativity in the case when space is closed without boundary satisfies
condition 2).
9 The Implementation of Mach’s Principle
Even with the strong Poincare´ sharpening of causality and the relativity
principle that suggested the formulation of the previous section, there are
many different possible theories that implement the above Mach’s princi-
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ples for particle models. However, nearly all of them predict an anisotropic
effective mass. That this could lead to a conflict with observation was al-
ready foreseen by the first creators of such theories: Hofmann, Reissner and
Schro¨dinger (their papers are translated in [6]). Since then, the extraordinar-
ily accurate Hughes–Drever null experiments [33, 34] have completely ruled
out such theories. In order to overcome this difficulty, Bertotti and I pro-
posed in 1982 [30] a universal method for creating theories that implement
Mach’s principle based on the notion of best matching as described above;
this avoids the mass-anisotropy problem, can be used whenever there is
‘economic representation with redundancy’, exploits the fundamental math-
ematics of Lie groups, and is intimately related to gauge theory.
Best matching resolves the problem of defining change in the presence of
gauge redundancy in the definition of configurations but not the representa-
tion of time (the second Mach’s principle). For the stronger form of Mach’s
principle, an external time is eliminated by defining a geodesic principle on
the considered relative configuration space. In this, the line element (action)
is taken equal to the square root of an expression quadratic in the velocities
that is subjected to best matching as described above. Then only intrinsic
differences defined without any external time contribute to the action. Since
the initial condition for a geodesic consists of a point and a direction, the
strong form of Mach’s principle is implemented. Examples of this can be
found in [30, 35], in which it is shown how Newtonian theory can be re-
covered either exactly or to a very good approximation for island universes
subject to the Machian conditions that they have exactly vanishing val-
ues for their total angular momentum (7) and dilatational momentum (8).
Best-matching principles are applied to the dynamics of geometry in super-
space and conformal superspace for the stronger form of Mach’s principle in
[30, 36, 37, 38] and in [32] for the weaker form. The cited geometrodynamic
papers present four main results. Having summarized them, I will end the
paper by considering what value they might have for future research.
The first thing that the papers show is that general relativity and a
completely scale-invariant theory rather similar to it can be derived from
Machian first principles. Whereas application of Machian principles to par-
ticles in Euclidean space leads to global conditions [the vanishing of (7)
and (8) for the complete universe], in the theories with dynamical geometry
local conditions are obtained. Indeed, best matching on superspace leads
to general relativity, in which the G00 = 0 and G0i = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, mem-
bers of Einstein’s field equations Gµν = 0, µ, ν = 1, 2, 3, 4, arise as Machian
conditions. The equation G00 = 0 is a local expression of the fact that no
external time appears in the theory, while the equations G0i = 0 arise from
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best matching and are local counterparts of the condition (7).
Second, the Machian approach reverses the historical discovery of special
and general relativity and puts the derivation of gauge theory in an interest-
ing perspective. One first seeks to create a Machian theory of the evolution
of Riemannian 3-geometry on a closed manifold and finds that the simplest
nontrivial such theory with local elimination of an external time is general
relativity. If one then attempts to couple matter fields to the dynamical ge-
ometry, it turns out that in all the simple ways in which this can be done the
matter fields must propagate with the same limiting speed as the geometri-
cal perturbations: the matter fields are forced to share the same ‘light cone’
as the geometry. In this way we find a Machian explanation of the local
validity of special relativity. Equally striking is the fact that the simplest
theories of a single 3-vector field interacting with Machian geometry and
of a set of 3-vector fields interacting with geometry and among themselves
turn out to be Maxwell and Yang–Mills fields, respectively. These results,
which show that all the well-established modern dynamical theories can be
derived from Machian principles, are obtained in [36, 39]. It should be said
that some of the uniqueness claims made in [36] relied on unjustified tacit
assumptions that ruled out more complicated possibilities, as is noted in the
careful study of [40, 41]. However, with the appropriate restrictions to the
simplest possibilities, the claim just made is, I believe, warranted.
Third, whereas the results so far described for Machian dynamics on
superspace could be seen as mainly of retrospective interest, those for con-
formal superspace [37, 38, 32] could be relevant to current research. This
is because of the light they cast on the failure of general relativity to be
conformally invariant (a topic of interest ever since Weyl identified this as
a problem in 1918 [42, 43]) and because the simplest Machian theory on
conformal superspace introduces a dynamically distinguished notion of si-
multaneity that is nevertheless compatible with classical general relativity
and, hence, the local validity of special relativity. This is because the sym-
metry breaking in the conformal approach arises of necessity through the
best-matching variation, which imposes not only a conformal constraint but
also a dynamically imposed gauge fixing. Since the aim in quantum theory
is to quantize only true degrees of freedom, this suggests that the gravita-
tional degrees of freedom are precisely the two conformal degrees of freedom
within a Riemannian three-geometry. If one insists on regarding relativity
of simultaneity as fundamental, it is not possible to identify definite degrees
of freedom in this manner. It may also be noted that theories in which
spacetime symmetry is broken by the introduction of a distinguished no-
tion of simultaneity have recently attracted much attention following the
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publication of Horˇava’s paper [44]. Whereas the symmetry breaking is sim-
ply imposed in Horˇava’s approach, it arises in the conformal approach of
necessity through a dynamically imposed gauge fixing.
Detailed discussion of the implications of the conformal results goes be-
yond the scope of this paper, but I would like to draw attention to [32],
which shows that although general relativity in its spacetime formulation is
not conformally covariant, as Weyl noted, it can be represented as a theory
on conformal superspace, where it appears to meet Weyl’s objections and is
an example of a theory in which a point and tangent vector on the relevant
quotient space determine the evolution. Only the local shapes of space and
their rate of change, expressed by a tangent vector, play a role. They appear
as the true dynamical degrees of freedom of the theory; the local scale fac-
tor is emergent, appearing merely in a distinguished gauge representation of
the theory. The status of the tangent vector in the initial data is also very
interesting. It is defined naturally and purely geometrically on conformal
superspace by analogy with the manner in which intrinsic change of shape
is defined in the velocity decomposition theorem discussed in Sec. 7. It is
therefore in essence a velocity vector, which implicitly presupposes a time
variable (since a velocity vector is by definition a displacement in unit time).
As implemented in general relativity, the implicit time is also emergent and
defined by the change of the emergent scale factor.
To conclude this paper, let me say a word about the overall structure
of the universe. As we have seen, Mach’s principle is difficult to formulate
if the universe has infinite extent. If we assume a finite (spatially closed)
universe, we then find that the geometrical evolution of such a universe
in accordance with Mach’s principle leads to general relativity and that
Einstein’s field equations are a direct expression of the Machian nature of
the theory. These are, however, local conditions and are perfectly compatible
with a universe of infinite extent. Thus, what seems to be a great success of
the theory threatens to undermine one of the key assumptions used to derive
the theory in the first place. I will not pretend to have an easy response
to this difficulty. As of now, the only suggestion that I can make is that
quantum gravity might dictate its resolution. Moreover, there is something
intuitively appealing about self-contained systems since, as Einstein said of
Mach’s idea, it closes “the series of causes of mechanical phenomena” [45],
p. 62. As we grope for a quantum theory of the universe, a quantum Mach’s
principle could be a crucial normative principle.
.
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